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ABSTRACT
It is now possible for anyone with rudimentary computer skills
to create a pornographic deepfake portraying an individual
engaging in a sex act that never actually occurred. These realistic
videos, called “deepfakes,” use artificial intelligence software to
impose a person’s face onto another person’s body. While
pornographic deepfakes were first created to produce videos of
celebrities, they are now being generated to feature other
nonconsenting individuals—like a friend or a classmate. This
Article argues that several tort doctrines and recent nonconsensual pornography laws are unable to handle published
deepfakes of non-celebrities. Instead, a federal criminal statute
prohibiting these publications is necessary to deter this activity.

INTRODUCTION
There is a video of you having sex on the internet. You do not
remember being with this person because it never happened. Others are
watching the video online, too.
The video is unfamiliar because it is a “deepfake”—an
“ultrarealistic fake video” where your face is superimposed onto another
person’s body though the use of artificial intelligence software. 1 And
someone has published it online for the world to see. This is not science
fiction.
In 2015, Google released TensorFlow, its “internal tool for
developing artificial intelligence algorithms,” to the public.2 Google CEO,
Sundar Pichai, believes that artificial intelligence will change humanity
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more profoundly than fire. 3 While Pichai recognizes fire’s benefits, he also
acknowledges that “it kills people” and that “we have to overcome its
downsides, too.”4 Similarly, although Google machine learning tools can
be used in beneficial ways, like discovering new planets, 5 they can also be
used for deviant purposes. This was illustrated when the anonymous
Redditor 6 under the moniker “deepfakes” used TensorFlow to transpose
Gal Gadot’s face, along with the faces of other celebrities, onto porn stars’
bodies in porn videos. 7 Photos of these celebrity faces were compiled from
Google image searches, stock photos, and YouTube videos.8 This
transposition is completed through a process of “deep learning.” “[D]eep
learning consists of networks of interconnected nodes that autonomously
run computations on input data” and deepfakes trains this algorithm on
both the celebrity’s faces and the porn videos. 9 “[T]he nodes arrange
themselves to complete a particular task, like convincingly manipulating
video on the fly”10 so the celebrity’s face and its various angles and
positions follow the body in the video.
A Hollywood production budget is not necessary to create
deepfakes from home. 11 All one needs is a computer, a decent graphics
card,12 the FakeApp program (which uses the open-source software
Google released), 13 hundreds of pictures of the desired person (known as
3
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a “faceset”), and a few hours of time. 14 A tutorial is easily accessible
online.15 While the deepfake movement began with adding celebrity faces
to porn stars, it quickly evolved into using images of friends and
classmates. The now-banned Deepfakes subreddit16 and a now-closed
Discord chatroom17 were hotbeds for users to exchange tips on producing
deepfake porn videos of each other’s crushes and ex-significant others.18
Other open-source tools like the DownAlbum19 and Instagram Scraper20
easily allow individuals to download all images on a person’s social media
account to create a faceset. 21 Still, to make a seamless deepfake, the
producer needs to find a body that matches the unwary victim’s face.
Finding the ideal body has also become quasi-automated. Browser-based
applications employing facial recognition software enable users to upload
a photo of the person they want in the fake video, and the website outputs
the most comparable adult performer. 22
Some websites have taken marginal steps to ensure that deepfakes
are not being created with the photos of non-consenting individuals.
Reddit has banned the deepfakes subreddit that had a hundred thousand
members.23 Discord has shut down two servers where the chats centered
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on deepfakes, and has banned several users. 24 Pornhub and Twitter have
also banned deepfake videos. 25 However, the websites hosting these
videos are shielded by a 1996 statute, the Communications Decency Act,26
which immunizes them from being legally responsible for user-generated
content.27 The webpages are not incentivized to take swift action to fight
these uploads, and many videos are still online. 28
Deepfakes are not only going to be used for self-gratification, but
also have the potential to be used to extort, humiliate, harass, and
blackmail victims. The creation of deepfakes is in its early stage, but this
type of production carries immense potential to be indistinguishable from
real-life videos. In our present age of misinformation, society will soon
have to deal with deepfakes that can threaten national security. Consider a
deepfake of President Trump announcing impending nuclear missile
attack on North Korea.
Unfortunately, as with many new technologies, the law is
unequipped to handle these impending issues. Courts must answer
questions like: should state tort doctrines or involuntary porn statutes be
interpreted to encompass fictitious fabricated videos? Does Congress need
to pass a law to handle these types of cases? Or, does the First Amendment
completely immunize the publication and creation of deepfakes as a form
of protected speech?
This Article will focus on the legality of pornographic deepfakes
featuring a non-celebrity, such as an acquaintance, and their circulation on
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websites and amongst friends. 29 It will show that sufficient legal
mechanisms are not in place to effectively prevent such deepfakes.30 In
this Article, these videos will be referred to as “personal deepfakes.”
Part I briefly explores First Amendment jurisprudence and argues
that the free speech clause does not protect false and obscene deepfakes.
Part II argues that most victims of published personal deepfakes are
currently left without sufficient legal remedies in the civil context: (1) the
producers of personal deepfakes are likely making fair use of the collated
copyrighted photos used in the videos because deepfakes are largely
transformative and often not for commercial profit; (2) only victims that
can show the producer aimed to cause severe emotional distress can
succeed on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; (3)
virtually no victim can bring a negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim since the victim was never in actual harm’s way; and (4) false light
invasion of privacy causes of action are most apt to handle these type of
videos, but the public at large must be aware of the deepfake—which is
unlikely. Part III examines how recent criminal statutes—“revenge porn”
laws—also fail to prohibit this conduct because producers likely do not
intend to harm the featured person. However, a substantial number of the
statutes have the potential to apply to personal deepfakes because they
include the word “depict,” which allows for an interpretation that
encompasses realistic portrayals of individuals. This Article then discusses
the need for a federal criminal statute prohibiting any online publication
of a deepfake and describes which elements should be included. Part IV
argues that solely creating the personal deepfakes in the confines of one’s
home should remain legally protected because mere production does not
carry the same harms as publishing the videos.

29
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FALSE SPEECH & OBSCENITY
Deepfakes, at their core, are false and crude videos. The legality
of publishing these videos thus implicates the First Amendment in two
contexts: false speech and obscenity. In regard to false speech, the free
marketplace of ideas, not the judicial system, is intended to correct
pernicious opinions.31 Yet, lies do not advance the robust debate on public
issues and do not carry any constitutional value.”32 Obscene speech is also
not afforded First Amendment protection. 33 So, the judicial system can
correct some pernicious speech—possibly deepfakes.
Courts are still hesitant when dealing with false speech to avoid
chilling otherwise protected or worthy speech. 34 There is a heavy
presumption against the constitutional validity of any system of prior
restraint of expression. 35 Although not considering an injunction in New
York Times v. Sullivan,36 the Supreme Court held that recovering damages
for defamation of a public official required showing that the false
statement was made with malice. 37 Malice was defined as “knowledge that
it was false or [made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.” 38 The Court laid out an even broader rule when dealing with
defamation of private individuals. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,39 the Court
held that states can define their own standard of liability for a publisher of
“defamatory falsehood[s] injurious to a private individual” so long as it is
not strict liability. 40 A standard of negligence or higher is required.
Therefore, in order for a defamation claim to be actionable, there
needs to be a form of distribution that brings speech into the public realm
where it can unjustly disrupt the free marketplace of ideas. Published
deepfakes—to the extent that they are a form of false speech—are not
constitutionally protected when used to intentionally defame a public or
private individual. Deepfakes can similarly be vulnerable to legal

See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339−40 (1974) (“However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”).
32
Id.
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Statements of Fact Under the First Amendment, 61 DUKE L.J. 469, 481–82 (2011).
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N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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38
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restrictions when viewed under the lens of another form of constitutionally
unprotected speech: obscenity.
Under the First Amendment, obscenity is not protected speech.41
Still, the Court has expressed skepticism about eroding the First
Amendment, stating:
The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be
left ajar; it must be kept tightly closed and opened only the slightest
crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important
interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity
safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material
which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.42

The test for judging whether this door is opened for federal and
state intrusion has become the Miller standard. While First Amendment
limitations “must always remain sensitive to any infringement on
genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression,” 43
material deemed obscene remains unprotected. 44 When analyzing a state
law, the Miller test asks:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest[]; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.45

The publication of all pornographic personal deepfakes cannot be deemed
obscene under the Miller test. If the deepfake does not violate community
standards (e.g., a non-graphic pornographic deepfake) or has some artistic
value (e.g., a deepfake featuring a unique blend of colors) then a state or
federal law prohibiting deepfakes would be unconstitutional. It is
important that the Court’s seminal obscenity cases centered around some
type of dissemination of obscene materials.46 Mere personal speech has

41
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not been construed as obscene; obscenity is attached to “materials.” 47 The
legality of banning the creation and viewing of personal deepfakes in the
privacy of one’s home (thus not actually distributing the deepfake) is
discussed in Part IV.48
Nonetheless, the pure falsity or fakery of personal deepfakes
raises the question of whether obscenity lies in the reality of the thing
deemed obscene or in the depiction of what registers as real. The Court
has reasoned through a similar issue, the visual depiction of minors
engaging in sex. In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,49 the Court analyzed
a federal statute prohibiting “‘any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated
image or picture’ that ‘is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.’” 50 Under the Miller standard,51 the Court acknowledged
that pedophiles could use these virtual videos to help encourage children
to engage in sexual activity52 but that not all teenage sexual activity
“appeal[s] to the prurient interest.”53 It further acknowledged that “teenage
sexual activity and the sexual abuse of children . . . have inspired countless
literary works” along with Academy Award winning films like American
Beauty.54 Therefore, the overbroad provision violated the First
Amendment.55 The Court’s treatment of fake or virtual videos appears to
be grounded in real harm, but the Court has not disclosed the possibility
that a more narrow prohibition on virtual pornography can be
constitutional.56 Obscenity thus seems to exist in the depiction of what
registers as real, with an special importance to it causing actual harm.
Personal deepfakes, although fictitious, can still cause actual harm to the
real person that is being depicted: the individual’s well-being, reputation,
and sense of security. Since no court has ruled on the constitutionality of
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (“This much has been categorically settled by the Court,
that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”) (citing Kois v.
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354
(1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)).
48
See infra Part IV.
49
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
50
Id. at 241.
51
Id. at 240.
52
Id. at 241.
53
Id. at 246.
54
Id. at 247−48.
55
Id. at 258.
56
See id. at 259–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court does leave open the
possibility that a more complete affirmative defense could save a statute's
constitutionality . . . implicitly accepting that some regulation of virtual child
pornography might be constitutional.”).
47
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banning personal deepfakes, we now turn to the current legal recourse for
victims.

II. CURRENT PRIVATE LEGAL RECOURSES FOR PUBLISHED
DEEPFAKES
This section focuses on the legal ramifications of when an
individual (“Producer”) collects images of a person (“Victim”), uses them
in creating a personal deepfake, and then publishes the product online by
uploading it to a website. The Producer would likely use a social media
site, like Facebook, to collect and collate photographs of the Victim to
create the deepfake faceset, taking advantage of potentially hundreds of
photos of the Victim at various angles. Victims might consider various
forms of recourse which will be analyzed below. None of these remedies,
however, are sufficient to handle personal deepfakes’ harms to the Victim.

A. Copyright Infringement & Fair Use
A Victim’s potential copyright infringement claims are likely to
fail despite retaining copyright protection in all of her photographs
uploaded online57 because the Producer is making fair use of the images.
Downloading a Facebook photo is essentially making a copy and is a
violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106, because the Victim is a copyright owner and
has a bundle of “exclusive rights.”58 The Victim has the exclusive right to
reproduce, copy, display, perform publicly, and prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted work—in this case, the uploaded photos. 59 Any
violation of one of these rights may result in a copyright infringement
cause of action.
Parodies are afforded protection through the fair use doctrine, but
a justification of labeling personal deepfakes as a parody in order to avoid
civil liability will likely fail. The owner’s exclusive rights of her
copyrighted work are limited when an individual makes “fair use” of the
work, allowing that person to reproduce the image. Fair use is permitted
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device. Works of authorship include . . . pictorial . . . works.”). But
bear in mind that Facebook, too, is granted “a non-exclusive, transferable, sublicensable, royalty-free, and worldwide license” to use any IP content that Victim
posts on or in connection with Facebook (IP License). Terms of Service, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Apr. 19, 2018).
58
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
59
See id.
57
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scholarship, or research.”60 To determine whether the use of a work is a
fair use, the statute lays out four factors:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 61
These factors are not to be treated in isolation, but instead are to be
explored together, “in light of the purposes of copyright[]:”62promoting
the arts and science. 63 The Supreme Court has focused on the purpose and
character of the use as protecting parodies since its analysis is guided by
whether the new work is “transformative” or “adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character.” 64
Parodies are transformative by humorously criticizing the former
work and providing some social benefit. 65 A subjective perception of
parodic character by the Producer of the new work is not enough. Instead,
the parodic character must be reasonably perceived; whether the parody is
done in good or bad taste is inconsequential for purposes of fair use. 66 A
vulgar parody was the subject of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.67
when the Court held that the 2 Live Crew song satirizing the Roy Orbison
song “Pretty Woman” could reasonably be perceived as commenting on
“the naiveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment
that ignores the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it
signifies.” 68 In a footnote, the Court further moderated its holding by
stating that parodies that more loosely target an original work than the 2

60

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Id.
62
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
63
Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]”).
64
Id. at 579.
65
See id. at 580.
66
Id. at 582.
67
Id. at 569.
68
Id. at 583.
61
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Live Crew song may still be a parody. 69 In addition to songs, parodic
pornographies have been protected by the fair use affirmative defense. The
Ninth Circuit held that the animated pornography “Starballz” made fair
use of “Star Wars” as it both broadly mimicked and ridiculed the
original. 70
Personal deepfakes likely are not protected by parody law because
parodies presuppose an underlying work that the new work is commenting
on in some way. While the Producer is substantially transforming the
photos of the Victim into a completely new video, there is no commentary
on a past work and thus no possible objective perception as parody. There
is even less space for the potential to be a parody in most personal
deepfakes since they aspire to blur the line between fantasy and reality.
The Producer and subsequent viewers likely create and watch personal
deepfakes for the sole purpose of deriving pleasure through the suspension
of disbelief—they want to believe that they are actually perceiving Gal
Gadot in a sexual act. In the case of an unsuspecting friend, the Producer
wants to believe that the visual depiction is actually the Victim.71
While not a parody, publishing personal deepfakes makes fair use
of another’s copyrighted images because it is transformative. Courts place
a strong emphasis on whether the new work is transformative, such that it
must “‘supersede[] the objects’” of the original copyrighted work. 72
Transforming the work into something new with a different purpose or
character likely satisfies the goal of promoting the arts and sciences. 73
“The more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance
of other factors, like commerciality, that may weigh against a finding of
fair use.” 74 Commercial use of copyrighted material presumptively creates
an unfair exploitation of the copyright owner’s monopoly privilege. 75 This
69

Id. at 580 n.14.
See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Media Mkt. Grp., Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (“A preliminary analysis of the fair use factors indicates that Lucasfilm
is not likely to succeed in its copyright claim because the parodic nature of
Starballz may constitute fair use.”).
71
Deepfakes outside the context of pornography can exist with parodic character.
For example, a deepfake featuring professional basketball players’ faces on Game
of Thrones characters can be a parody about how the playoff race is likened to the
war over who will rule the Iron Throne.
72
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841)).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984)).
70
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is further elucidated by the fourth factor, the effect on the copyrighted
work’s potential market or value, which is “undoubtedly the single most
important element of fair use.” 76 This factor’s analysis focuses on the
causal connection between the infringement, the loss of revenue, 77 and the
potential market for the copyrighted work. 78 The Victim still has the
opportunity to use her specific Facebook photos for any commercial
purpose, and its potential market value remains intact. Due to the nature
of personal deepfakes, the Victim will be unable to distinguish which
specific photograph is being used at a specific moment, complicating the
issue of whether the Victim can succeed on a copyright infringement cause
of action.
Despite deepfakes’ transformative nature, courts have never dealt
with this type of medium, and there remains a chance that a judge can
conclude that these publications sidestep the true intent of fair use—
promoting the arts. While § 107’s list of purposes is not exhaustive
(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research),
they give a general idea of activities regarded as fair use. 79 Exploitation of
another individual for lewd and sexual purposes may not fall into any of
these categories. Regardless, the available remedies for victims of
copyright infringement remain inadequate and insufficient. There is
monetary relief: actual damages, disgorgement of the infringer’s profits,
statutory damages, 80 and attorney’s fees. 81 But actual damages and
statutory damages (up to $150,000 per work infringed) 82 may not be
plentiful since the Producer likely did not profit off the publication of the
personal deepfake. Copyright infringement can lead to criminal
punishment, too, but this is only when “the infringement was committed
. . . for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 83
Lastly, courts can grant an injunction, 84 but an injunction will likely fail to

76

Id. at 566.
See id. at 567 (“Similarly, once a copyright holder establishes with reasonable
probability the existence of a causal connection between the infringement and a
loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to show that this
damage would have occurred had there been no taking of copyrighted
expression.”).
78
Id. at 568.
79
Id. at 560.
80
17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
81
Id. § 505.
82
Id. § 504.
83
Id. § 506.
84
17 U.S.C. § 502.
77
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erase personal deepfakes that have been broadly distributed around the
internet.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In addition to any inadequate copyright infringement claims, the
Victim may attempt to bring a bevy of tort claims. They too are subject to
their own flaws and limitations.
The Victim may pursue legal action by bringing a state tort claim
of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). State doctrines
vary, but most require a showing that (1) the Producer intended to (2)
cause the Victim severe emotional distress (3) by extreme and outrageous
conduct and (4) the Victim suffered severe emotional distress as a result
of the extreme and outrageous conduct. 85 IIED cases require a deep factual
analysis, and the Victim may only succeed in narrow circumstances where
the Producer had the requisite intent and the Victim had suffered
extremely.
Almost all Victims of published personal deepfakes should be able
to show the third element, that the publication of the deepfakes constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct. Extreme and outrageous conduct does
not extend to insults, threats, or annoyances. 86 Instead, the conduct must
be beyond the bounds of human decency, such that it would be regarded
as intolerable in a civilized community. 87 Here, the Victim could likely
show that she, and reasonable members of the public will view the
personal deepfake as outrageous. Assuming one even recognizes the
fakery, the sheer realness of the video is likely to send a shiver down one’s
spine and deliver a punch to one’s moral gut. It seems perfectly reasonable
to imagine that a jury would find that personal deepfakes rise to the level
of extreme and outrageous conduct when the Victim realizes that there is
a published video of herself engaging in graphic, and even heinous, acts.
The Victim must show that her distress is not only caused by the
deepfake, but that the distress is severe enough to cause “mental suffering,
mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like.” 88 Under the fourth
element, reactions of humiliation, embarrassment, anger, and/or horror
must be extreme or “so severe that no reasonable man could be expected
to endure it.” 89 The Victim can feel distress from either watching it herself,
or simply knowing it exists online or is being viewed by others. The
85

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
See id. cmt. d.
87
Id.
88
Id. at cmt. j.
89
Id.
86
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personal deepfake’s vileness and the number of viewers will likely affect
the severity of the emotional distress and the strength of the IIED claim.
Only a limited subset of Victims will succeed because of an inability to
show that their mere embarrassment or even mortification rises to the level
of emotional distress necessary to satisfy the second element. This group
includes Victims of deepfakes that are not so graphic and Victims that are
simply displeased but not extremely suffering.
Victims will also have trouble showing the first element, the mens
rea requirement. The Producer must “know[] that such distress is certain,
or substantially certain, to result from his conduct” or that the reckless
conduct was “in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that
the emotional distress will follow.” 90 The majority of the Producers who
share a video online with friends or the general public will likely not know
that any emotional distress is imminent because they do not expect that the
Victim will watch the video or that the Victim will even learn of its
existence. This high standard will prevent many Victims from succeeding
on this cause of action when they stumble upon the video online or are
made aware of the video by a third party. IIED claims, thus, appear to be
limited to instances where the Producer intentionally sends the deepfake
to the Victim or informs her of its circulation on the internet. The threat of
IIED claims will not effectively diminish publications of deepfakes.
The Victims of deepfakes will also have to deal with the Producer
using the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause as a defense. Freedom
of speech can act as a defense in state tort suits like IIED in the same way
it can to defamation claims. 91 The Court set aside a jury verdict imposing
IIED tort liability on Westboro Baptist Church in Snyder v. Phelps,92
where a deceased soldier’s father brought action against Westboro for
picketing his son’s funeral.93 Whether the First Amendment protects this
type of conduct depends on whether the speech is of public concern—in
other words, whether it is deserving of substantially more protection than
matters of private concern. 94 The Court reiterated language from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan about the Constitution’s commitment to maintaining
debates on public issues to be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”95
90

Id. at cmt. i.
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 450−51 (2011) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988)).
92
Id. at 459.
93
Id. at 447.
94
See id. at 458 (“Given that Westboro's speech was at a public place on a matter
of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First
Amendment.”).
95
Id. at 452 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
91
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Matters of public concern relate to “any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community[.]”96 The Court opined that the circulation of
videos of an employee engaging in sexual acts would be a private concern,
since they “did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of the
[employing agency’s] functioning or operation.” 97 Similarly, personal
deepfake Producers are not informing the community of anything of public
concern—they are just fabricating a video of an individual doing a private
act. The First Amendment recognizes the quintessential importance of the
freedom to speak one’s mind as it relates to “the common quest for truth
and the vitality of society as a whole[,]” 98 but deepfakes are not a part of
this journey. Finally, this affirmative defense can be weakened to the
extent courts find deepfakes to be obscene, which lacks First Amendment
protection.99

C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Recovery for a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
(“NIED”) claim will largely rely on the state where the action is brought,
that state’s applicable tort doctrine, and the factual context of the
disseminated deepfake. Generally, these types of cases fall into two
categories: (1) individuals who just escaped physical harm and
consequently suffer emotional distress; and (2) bystanders who suffer
emotional distress while witnessing another individual being harmed. 100
The first category of non-bystanders most closely resembles the context of
published deepfakes, and the NIED doctrine within this category widely
varies by state. Six states require a plaintiff to show that there was a
physical impact as an effect of the negligent act, 101 and over a dozen states
require the plaintiff show that she was in the zone of danger during the
negligent conduct.102
However, a substantial amount of states allow recovery when the
negligently inflicted emotional distress produced “some physical sign of

96

Id. at 453 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).
Id. (citing San Diego v. Roe, 542 U.S. 77, 84 (2004)).
98
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (quoting Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503−04 (1984)).
99
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
100
John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm,
90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 809−10 (2007).
101
Id. at 810. The states are Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky and
Nevada. Id. at 920 n.113.
102
Id. at 815. The states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id. at 812 n.141.
97
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its existence.”103 For example, Missouri allows a plaintiff to recover for
NIED when “(1) the defendant should have realized that his conduct
involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress; and (2) the
emotional distress or mental injury must be medically diagnosable and
must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant.” 104
Missouri replaced the impact rule with this rule in Bass v. Nooney Co.,105
when a woman suffered from anxiety after being trapped in an elevator
twenty stories above ground-level.106 The issue with personal deepfake
Victims is that they were never in a situation where actual physical harm
from some tangible thing existed, like being trapped in an elevator.
Eight states have even fewer limitations on recovery of damages
for NIED for non-bystanders.107 For example, Tennessee approaches these
cases under the general negligence doctrine—requiring a plaintiff to show
that a defendant had a duty, breached that duty, and caused an injury or
loss.108 And the emotional injury has to be so serious or severe that “a
reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately
cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case.”109 The Tennessee Supreme Court instituted this rule after a plaintiff
viewed a dead body caused by a car accident.110
These NIED cases highlight how many states require some
physical incident that caused some real emotional harm—with or without
accompanying physical symptoms. With personal deepfakes, the Victim
never came close to being physically touched by something harmful or
perceiving a traumatizing event that actually happened. Under current
statues and precedent, it is unlikely that courts will begin to construe the
NIED doctrine in a way that encapsulates fake videos that merely appear
real. Even when personal deepfakes become so indistinguishable from
videos of real events, Victims will generally know that they are not
actually appearing in the videos and the portrayed act never occurred.
103

Id. at 812. The states are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Utah. Id. at 920 n.123.
104
Id. at 814 (citing Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772−73 (Mo. 1983)
(en banc)).
105
646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
106
Id. at 813.
107
Id. at 816 n.146. The states are Hawaii, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.
108
Id. at 817 (citing Camper v. Minor 915 S.W.2d 437, 446 (Tenn. 1996)).
109
Camper, 915 S.W.2d at 446.
110
Id. at 439.
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A rare individual may succeed with an NIED claim if the Producer
owed a duty of care to the Victim. In Catsouras v. Department of
California Highway Patrol,111 a California court found that a decedent’s
family had a “cause of action for negligence, supporting emotional distress
damages” when officers disseminated gruesome pictures of the decedent’s
body via the Internet. 112 The California Highway Patrol owed a duty of
care to the family to not put these “images on the Internet for the lurid
titillation of persons unrelated to official CHP business.” 113 The court
focused on three factors: foreseeability, moral blame, and the prevention
of future harm. 114 Therefore, in the context of personal deepfakes, it is
possible for a Victim in California to have a cause of action against
someone who uses photographs accessed by virtue of some relationship
with the Victim that included a duty of care. While this fact pattern, too,
can aim to satisfy one’s “lurid titillation,” the court may still hesitate to
liken a personal deepfake to the repugnant photos in Catsouras. Personal
deepfakes are still fake, and the respondents in Catouras had to relive real
images of the teenage girl’s decapitated corpse. Most Victims of personal
deepfakes will not have a claim of this rare caliber.115

D. False Light
False Light tort claims, one of four distinct forms of invasion of
the right of privacy, 116 are the most applicable to deepfakes. Thirty-three

111

104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352 (Cal Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 358.
113
Id. at 376.
114
Id at 358. The court also considers other factors:
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
. . . the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
See id. at 372.
115
This type of victim would not be able to recover in Arkansas and New Mexico
as these two states continue to prohibit recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. See Kircher, supra note 100 at 809 n.110 (citing Mechs.
Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ark. 1988); Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne
Mortuary, Inc., 954 P.2d 45, 50 (N.M. 1997)).
116
The three other forms are “Intrusion Upon Seclusion,” “Appropriation of Name
or Likeness,” and “Publicity Given to Private Life.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 652B−D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). In the context of deepfakes, possible
claims would involve the following examples: hacking one’s photos to create
faceset (intrusion upon seclusion); using a deepfake in an advertisement
112
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states’ common law doctrines allow for false light claims that generally
have some common elements.117 An individual may be liable when
“giv[ing] publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light.” The portrayal must be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and the actor must have had knowledge or acted in
reckless disregard in publicizing this person in a false light. 118 Any
revelation of matters that are of “legitimate concern to the public” are not
invasions of privacy, 119 and “publicity” refers to a communication made
“to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” 120
For example, the Ninth Circuit found a false light claim viable
when a Playgirl magazine cover featured a shirtless Baywatch actor, Jose
Salano, Jr., next to the headline, “TV Guys. PRIMETIME’S SEXY
YOUNG STARS EXPOSED.” 121 The court agreed that Salano had a
triable issue of fact for the false light tort. The placement of the photograph
and the text, the nude pictures of men inside the magazine, and the large
bold letters screaming “12 Sizzling Centerfolds -- Ready to Score With
You” insinuated that Solano was one of those individuals. 122 Such analysis
is applicable to personal deepfakes as they portray the Victim as being the
person partaking in the sexual act.
With personal deepfakes, the success of a false light claim also
depends on the specific context of the deepfake and its publication as well
as the state where the claim was brought. For instance, in California, “the
information [must be] understood by one or more persons to whom it was
disclosed as stating or implying something highly offensive that would
have a tendency to injure Solano's reputation.” 123 California’s standard of
only requiring one individual to view the publication is much more victimfriendly than the Restatement’s requirement of being viewed by the public

(appropriation of name or likeness); and taking peeping tom photos to be used in
a deepfake (publicity given to private life).
117
See 33 RICHARD E. KAYE, C AUSES OF ACTION 1 (2d ed. 2007).
The states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. Id.
118
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (A M. LAW INST. 1977).
119
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
120
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
121
Solano v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002).
122
See id. at 1082–83.
123
Id. at 1082.
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at large. Twenty states have followed the Restatement. 124 Personal
deepfake Victims in these states will likely have to wait until a substantial
population of people watch the video to bring a false light cause of action.
False light claims become murkier when the Producer has a
warning or title that prefaces the video as fake or fictitious. Courts are
likely to carefully balance the Producer’s First Amendment right to create
fictitious works with the Victim’s privacy rights. 125 The right of
publicity126 does not exist when “a fictionalized account of an event in the
life of a public figure is depicted in a novel or a movie.” 127 The same
limitation is likely applicable to private individuals. Victims of personal
deepfakes will not be able to recover when that video discloses its
fabrication to viewers. Today, many deepfakes found on pornographic
websites have a few-second introductory title stating the username of the
Producer that manufactured that video. This title is likely intended to give
credit to the Producer rather than signify to the viewer that this is, indeed,
fake pornography, but its consequence is as if the disclaimer stated it was
fake. Disclaimers will likely diminish the strength of false light claims, but
courts should still recognize the possibility that the viewer skipped the
disclaimer or that the next distributor edited it out entirely. Victims may
be left without any false light recourse if the disclaimer remains
permanently on the video in a clear fashion.
Similarly, the Victim of a low-quality personal deepfake—one
that a reasonable person cannot believe to be true—will have difficulty
recovering in this situation because its fakeness will be evident to viewers.
In these personal deepfakes, the face may glitch by not following the head
properly, be fixed into only one position, or not be properly rendered to
look three-dimensional. However, it is likely this will become less of an
issue as deepfake technology improves.

124

The states are Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and Washington. 33 C AUSES
OF ACTION 2d 1, Cause of Action for False Light Invasion of Privacy (2007)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977)).
125
See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 426, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(“Thus, the Court of Appeals in Spahn balanced the plaintiff's privacy rights
against the first amendment protection of fictionalization Qua falsification and,
after finding there to be no such protection, held for the plaintiff.”).
126
“The ‘right of publicity’ gives famous people an assignable and descendible
right in the commercial value of their names, likenesses, and other identifying
characteristics.” Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 C AL. L. REV. 127, 127 (1993).
127
Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 433.
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Remedies for false light invasion of privacy are similar to
copyright infringement in that actual and punitive damages can help make
the Victim whole but will not keep the video universally off the internet
where it can continuously be distributed to others. 128 If courts view
deepfakes as protected speech under the First Amendment, there will
likely be little room for compensatory damages. Moreover, intent and
reputational harm plays a role in determining whether a false light claim
overcomes constitutional protections of freedom of press. For example,
the Second Circuit overturned a jury verdict for a false light claim because
the plaintiff failed to show the requisite intent 129 when the defendant
misidentified the plaintiff as being the person in topless photos in a
magazine.130 The Second Circuit was additionally concerned that “such an
enormous verdict chills media First Amendment rights” and downplayed
whether nude pictures “are even capable of producing genuine reputational
harm.” 131 Whether a personal deepfake causes great emotional distress or
reputational harm will depend greatly on its quality (and perhaps whether
there was a disclaimer) as well as its impact on the viewers.
Under the current legal framework, the majority of current and
future Victims of personal deepfakes will fall through the legal cracks and
be left without recourse. Victims who do not suffer from debilitating
emotional distress cannot bring an IIED claim. Additionally, Victims who
cannot show that the Producer intended to cause the emotional distress
cannot bring an IIED claim. Mere distributors or further circulators of an
already-produced personal deepfake will also not have the requisite intent.
The success of an NIED cause of action will depend on the parties’
jurisdiction, but these claims will generally not be fruitful. Courts are
hesitant to allow recovery for victims of incidents where the victims were
not in jeopardy of that harm or did not watch someone be physically
harmed. Moreover, false light invasion of privacy claims will not cover
most Victims, unless the public at large becomes aware of the personal
deepfake’s presence. Lastly, plaintiffs of false light claims may not be able
to recover if there is a disclaimer that the deepfake is fake. A discussion
of First Amendment rights will remain in the background for these claims,

128

Damages for this type of action include special damages, punitive damages,
and actual damages from the harm to the Victim’s privacy interests and her mental
and emotional distress. See 92 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 17 (updated 2018).
129
Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 141 (2d Cir. 1984).
130
Id. at 127.
131
Id. at 141. The court presumed that because many celebrities have been
portrayed nude, that these pictures are not as capable of causing a harm to one’s
reputation. See id.
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and the courts must decide how to balance free speech rights and the harm
that personal deepfakes can cause.
Recovery for these torts will not make the Victim whole. Even if
they are handsomely compensated, the video will remain on the internet
perhaps indefinitely. Others can redistribute and republish the video
online, making it nearly impossible for the Victim to continuously get
webhosts to delete this content. The only way to deter this activity is to
attach criminal liability to these publications.

III. FUTURE LEGAL RECOURSE FOR PUBLISHED PERSONAL
DEEPFAKES: NONCONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY LAWS
Fairly recent nonconsensual pornography statutes may be the most
effective legal recourse against uploaders of personal deepfakes featuring
nonconsenting individuals. Thirty-eight states and the District of
Columbia have nonconsensual pornography laws. 132 Under these statutes,
132

Alabama (Distributing a private image with intent to harass, threaten, coerce,
or intimidate the person depicted, ALA. CODE § 13A-6-240) (LexisNexis Supp.
2017)); Alaska (Harassment in the second degree, ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120 (a)(6)
(2016)); Arizona (Unlawful disclosure of images depicting states of nudity or
specific sexual activities, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1425) (Supp. 2017));
Arkansas (Unlawful distribution of sexual images or recordings, ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 5-26-314) (Supp. 2017)); California (Disorderly conduct, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 647) (West Supp. 2018)); Colorado (Posting a private image for
harassment, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-107) (2018)); Connecticut (Unlawful
dissemination of an intimate image, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-189c) (West Supp.
2018)); Delaware (Violation of privacy, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1335) (2017));
District of Columbia (Second degree unlawful publication, D.C. CODE § 22-3054)
(2015)); Florida (Sexual cyber harassment, FLA. STAT. § 784.049) (West 2017));
Georgia (Prohibition on nude or sexually explicit electronic transmissions, GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-90) (2018); Hawaii (Violation of privacy in the first degree,
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1110.9) (LexisNexis 2018)); Idaho (Crime of video
voyeurism, IDAHO CODE § 18-6609) (Supp. 2018)); Illinois (Non-consensual
dissemination of private sexual images, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-23)
(West 2017)); Iowa (Harassment, IOWA CODE § 708.7) (West Supp. 2018));
Kansas (Breach of privacy, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101) (Supp. 2017)); Louisiana
(Nonconsensual disclosure of a private image, LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283) (West
2018)); Maine (Unauthorized dissemination of certain private images, ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 511-A) (Supp. 2017)); Maryland (Revenge porn, MD.
CODE, ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-809) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017)); Michigan
(Dissemination of sexually explicit visual material, MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
750.145e) (West Supp. 2018); Minnesota (Nonconsensual dissemination of
private sexual images, MINN. STAT. § 604.31) (West Supp. 2018)); Nevada
(Unlawful dissemination of intimate image, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.780)
(2015)); New Hampshire (Nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images,
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a Producer may be punished criminally, not solely civilly. 133 Statutory
language varies widely by jurisdiction with many states targeting “revenge
porn”—cases where former sexual partners post sexually explicit photos
or videos of a person online to cause distress or embarrassment. 134 These
laws feature certain phrases that are both applicable and inapplicable to
personal deepfakes.
North Carolina’s statute contains typical language that this section
will analyze in the context of personal deepfakes. 135
(1) The person knowingly discloses an image of another person with
the intent to do either of the following: a. Coerce, harass, intimidate,
demean, humiliate, or cause financial loss to the depicted person. b.
Cause others to coerce, harass, intimidate, demean, humiliate, or
cause financial loss to the depicted person. (2) The depicted person
is identifiable from the disclosed image itself or information offered
in connection with the image. (3) The depicted person's intimate parts
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:9-a) (Supp. 2018)); New Jersey (Disclosure of
images of sexual contact or undergarment-clad intimate parts of another person,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9) (West Supp. 2018)); New Mexico (Unauthorized
distribution of sensitive images; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37A-1) (Supp. 2018));
North Carolina (Disclosure of private images, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A)
(2017)); North Dakota (Distribution of intimate images without or against
consent, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.2) (Supp. 2017)); Oklahoma
(Nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
1040.13b) (West Supp. 2018)); Oregon (Unlawful dissemination of an intimate
image, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.472) (2017)); Pennsylvania (Unlawful
dissemination of an intimate image, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131) (West 2015));
South Dakota (Use or dissemination of visual recording or photographic
device without consent and with intent to self-gratify, harass, or embarrass, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-21-4) (West 2017)); Tennessee (Unlawful exposure; image,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-318) (2018)); Texas (Unlawful disclosure or
promotion of intimate visual material, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.16) (West
Supp. 2017); Utah (Distribution of an intimate image, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5b203) (LexisNexis 2017)); Vermont (Disclosure of sexually explicit images
without consent, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2606) (Supp. 2017)); Virginia
(Unlawful dissemination or sale of images of another VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2386.2) (2014)); Washington (Disclosing intimate images, WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.86.010) (West Supp. 2018)); West Virginia (Nonconsensual disclosure of
private intimate images, W. VA. CODE § 61-8-28a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018));
Wisconsin (Representations depicting nudity, WIS. STAT. § 942.09) (2018)).
133
See id.
134
See Revenge Porn, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/revenge_porn. (last visited Oct. 20,
2018).
135
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A.
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are exposed or the depicted person is engaged in sexual conduct in
the disclosed image. (4) The person discloses the image without the
affirmative consent of the depicted person. (5) The person discloses
the image under circumstances such that the person knew or should
have known that the depicted person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy.136

A. Intent to Harm
Twenty-four jurisdictions contain a culpability requirement that
the individual must intend to cause harm to the other individual by
disseminating the sexually explicit photograph or video. 137 Including
North Carolina, sixteen of the twenty-four states specifically include an
intent to “harass”138 while others use similar language, such as intent to
“intimidate,”139 cause “emotional distress,”140 and harm the person’s
“health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or
personal relationships[.]”141 Much like the IIED claims, these statutes will
fail to protect the same majority of potential Victims of personal
deepfakes. The Producers that share deepfakes amongst friends or post
online without any harmful intent are not criminally liable.

B. Expectation of Privacy
Statutes containing language about disseminating images under
circumstances where the individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy create another roadblock for Producers to be criminally culpable.
Thirteen states include such language. 142 The Producer will argue that the
plaintiff did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy to a fake
video. The Victim or her sexual partner did not take the video of herself
engaging in the sexual act because that act never occurred. Moreover, the
images used in the faceset are widely accessible through social media sites,
136

Id.
See supra note 132, for details into the scope of these states’ statutes. The states
are Alabama; Alaska; Colorado; District of Columbia; Florida; Hawaii; Iowa;
Kansas; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Michigan; Nevada; New Mexico; North
Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; Tennessee; Utah;
Vermont; Virginia; and West Virginia.
138
Id. The states are Alabama; Alaska; Colorado; Kansas; Louisiana; Maine;
Nevada; New Mexico; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South
Dakota; Vermont; Virginia; and West Virginia.
139
Id., Iowa.
140
Id., Maryland; Tennessee; Utah.
141
Id., Hawaii.
142
Id., Alabama; Arizona; Connecticut; Delaware; Idaho; Kansas; Minnesota;
North Carolina; North Dakota; South Dakota; Utah; Vermont; Washington; and
Wisconsin.
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and the nude private parts are taken from already published porn clips,
likely featuring porn stars who willingly revealed their body. A strong
argument for Victims would be likening the privacy interests in these fake
videos to the privacy interests in false light tort claims—the Victims’ right
to not be publicized in a false light. 143 The Victim can also argue the
deepfake is so life-like that it is as if the video represented a real, private
event. Courts’ interpretation of “privacy” as to whether the video had to
be fully real is similar to the task of interpreting whether “intimate” body
parts have to actually be the Victim’s.

C. Intimate Areas and Sexual Acts
Sixteen states use the phrase “intimate parts” or “intimate
areas” which are typically defined in statutes as the unclothed genital
areas.145 Some states also use “engaged in a sexual act,” 146 and “state of
nudity.” 147 Given that personal deepfakes often superimpose a Victim’s
head on the body of another, the central question is: can these terms apply
to a Victim whose actual body parts are not visible? Or, can “intimate body
parts” refer to areas that are not the Victim’s?
144

The answer to this question may lie in the usage of “depiction.”
Like North Carolina, thirty-one states148 use the term “depicted person’s
intimate parts.”149 However, depiction is not usually defined in these
statutes. In Pennsylvania, “visual depiction” is defined as “[a]
representation by picture, including, but not limited to, a photograph,

143

See discussion supra Part II.D.
Id., California; Colorado; Idaho; Louisiana; Maryland; Minnesota; Nevada;
New Jersey; North Carolina; Oklahoma; Oregon; Tennessee; Texas; Washington;
and West Virginia.
145
See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 647 (“‘[I]ntimate body part’ means any portion of
the genitals, the anus and in the case of a female, also includes any portion of the
breasts below the top of the areola, that is either uncovered or clearly visible
through clothing.”); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-23.5 (“’Intimate parts’ means the
fully unclothed, partially unclothed or transparently clothed genitals, pubic area,
anus, or if the person is female, a partially or fully exposed nipple, including
exposure through transparent clothing.”).
146
See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.61.120 (a)(6)); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-23.5.
147
See supra note 132. These states are Arkansas; Arizona; Maine; and
Pennsylvania.
148
Id. These states are Alabama; Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado;
Delaware; District of Columbia; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Louisiana;
Maine; Minnesota; Nevada; New Mexico; North Carolina; North Dakota;
Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah;
Vermont; Virginia; West Virginia; Wisconsin; and Washington.
149
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-190.5A.
144
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videotape, film or computer image.” 150 This follows the ordinary meaning
of “depiction.” Oxford English Dictionary’s definition includes “graphic
representation” 151 and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines “depiction” as “representation” and “portrayal.” 152
“Representation” is further defined as “a likeness, picture, model, or other
reproduction.”153 These definitions clarify that “depiction” can apply to
more than a real-life, true to form representation of a given thing (in this
case a person). The term can apply to instances where a person is portrayed
in video-form through a combined representation of that individual’s face
and another person’s body. Since faces are generally used to differentiate
between people, there can be a depiction of the Victim when their face is
clearly shown and the body is represented to be that person’s. North
Carolina’s involuntary porn statute also allows this reasoning by defining
“image” as “any visual depiction . . . or computer-generated image.” 154
North Dakota and Utah have similar language. 155 Victims’ hope for a
victory in criminal court thus depends on the Producers’ intent and judges’
interpretations of key phrases like “privacy,” “intimate areas,” and
“depiction.”

D. The Need for a Federal Criminal Statute
Deepfakes will become so life-like that they will be
indistinguishable from actual videos. This is an inevitable consequence of
artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies. The law should
be equipped to handle this impending problem. Currently, courts may be
hesitant to agree that the Victim becomes the nude person in the deepfake
for purposes of non-consensual pornography statutes. State legislatures
likely did not intend to criminalize personal deepfakes as they did not exist
when the laws were introduced. The requisite intent to harm illustrates that
they were trying to deter harassing and retaliatory conduct, more so than a
sharing of a video for pure self-gratification.156 As shown in the previous
section,157 tort law is unlikely to deter future Producers of this type of
content since only limited groups of Victims will be able to seek and
recover damages. Shifting this litigation from a plaintiff in a civil context,
who has to incur the accompanying legal costs, to the criminal context
150

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131.
Depiction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
152
Depiction, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993).
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Representation, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993).
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§ 14-190.5A.
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See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-07.2 (Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 765b-203 (LexisNexis 2017).
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Of course, personal deepfakes can be used in a retaliatory manner as well.
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See supra Part II.
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where a prosecutor takes the reigns in representing the state or
government, is the best avenue for recourse. Additionally, a federallyadministered legal scheme would remove any ambiguities in the statutory
language and ensure uniformity, which is important as internet content can
surely cross state lines.158
An ideal federal statute would prohibit the online publication of
deepfakes and would not require an intent to harm. Publishing personal
deepfakes online is akin to an online publication of a sex tape without the
involved person’s consent. The inability to permanently delete content
from the internet creates enough mental, emotional, and physical harm to
warrant prohibition. Sending a personal deepfake via email to a friend
should be considered an online publication because of the likelihood that
the video will linger on the internet forever. Current laws against
distributing private images online, too, should not require an “intentional”
level of mens rea since these victims suffer from similar issues as personal
deepfake victims. Therefore, this statute should also punish online
circulators of these personal deepfakes, including those who did not even
produce the video. The statute should use the word “depiction” and include
computer-generated images within its definition. This federal nonconsensual pornography statute, thus, would encapsulate both real private
videos and deepfakes. Lastly, the statute should also permit a civil action
to be brought against a Producer who violates that statute. Florida
approaches revenge porn statutes this way by allowing an individual to
bring a separate civil cause of action to incur injunctive relief and actual
damages.159
Even in the criminal context, this statute would be limited by First
Amendment protections, such as when the image is “related to a matter of
public interest, public concern, or related to a public figure who is
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions, or by
reasons of his fame shapes events in areas of concern to society.” 160 These
limitations are unlikely to apply to most personal deepfakes, but they may
be implicated if this statute covers public figures whose images are
published online without their consent. The legality of mere production of
personal deepfakes is a separate issue.

158

Congress has constitutional power to pass laws dealing with internet content
under the Commerce Clause. See e.g., United States v. Giboney, 863 F.3d 1022,
1026 (8th Cir. 2017) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 527 (2017) (“The [i]nternet is an
instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
159
FLA. STAT. § 784.049 (West 2017).
160
La. Stat. ANN. § 14:283 (West 2018).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

125

IV. LEGALITY OF PRODUCING BUT NOT PUBLISHING
PERSONAL DEEPFAKES
The creation of personal deepfakes at home does not carry the
same harms that accompany published ones. The Victim does not have the
chance to be traumatized by the otherworldly, out-of-body experience of
watching herself perform something that never happened or knowing that
others are also watching. Friends, family, and colleagues do not get to
wrestle with watching a video that they may believe is real. Personal
deepfakes are lewd and even despicable, but is this enough? Moral
disapproval does not necessitate illegality.
Courts are most likely to analyze the legality of producing
deepfakes at home under obscenity doctrine and the Miller test. The
Supreme Court found that child pornography is not afforded First
Amendment protection even when not obscene under Miller.161 In New
York v. Ferber,162 the Court found a compelling state interest in
“safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor”163
when upholding the New York statute prohibiting the promotion of child
pornography.164 It is inconsequential whether there is any literary, artistic,
political, scientific, or social value when there is the sexual exploitation of
the child.165
Congress has attempted to prohibit further forms of child
pornography by passing the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA),166
which included a prohibition on “any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated
image or picture” that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.” 167 This prohibition included “virtual child
pornography,” which can be created by either using adults looking like
minors or with the assistance of computer generated images. 168 The
Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition found the federal
statute went beyond Ferber since no actual children were being
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New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
163
Id. at 756 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)).
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Id. at 774.
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Id. at 761.
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Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-209, § 2251, 110
Stat 3009 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251).
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Id. § 2256.
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Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002).
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exploited. 169 Thus, the federal statute had to be analyzed under Miller,170
and it was still overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment. 171 As
mentioned earlier, the Court acknowledged that pedophiles could use these
virtual videos to help encourage children to engage in sexual activity 172
but that not all teenage sexual activity “appeal[s] to the prurient
interest.”173 Moreover, both “teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse
of children . . . have inspired countless literary works.” 174 Courts cannot
ban a product only because of its potential to be used for immoral
purposes.175
After Free Speech Coalition, Congress changed § 2256(8)’s
definition to “digital image, computer image, or computer-generated
image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.” 176 This updated statute has not been legally
challenged yet, and the issue becomes increasingly complex as virtual
images become more lifelike, 177 especially with the emergence of personal
deepfakes. In 2003, Congress also passed the PROTECT Act, which
prohibits the “making [of] a visual depiction that is a digital image,
computer image, or computer-generated image of, or that is
indistinguishable from an image of, a minor engaging in specified sexually
explicit conduct.” 178 Under this Act a man was convicted in 2008 for
receiving online anime cartoons depicting minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct. 179 The Fourth Circuit found that this material was
obscene under Miller and upheld the conviction. 180 The Supreme Court
declined to hear the case. 181
169

Id. at 240.
Id.
171
Id. at 256.
172
Id. at 241.
173
Id. at 246.
174
Id. at 247−48.
175
See id. at 251 (“There are many things innocent in themselves, however, such
as cartoons, video games, and candy, that might be used for immoral purposes,
yet we would not expect those to be prohibited because they can be misused.”).
176
See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2016).
177
Lori J. Parker, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal
Enactments Proscribing Obscenity and Child Pornography or Access Thereto on
the Internet, 7 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2005).
178
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2252).
179
See United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied,
558 U.S. 1117 (2010).
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Id.
170

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

127

These cases help elucidate how to approach personal deepfakes
and the Miller test. A statute banning all deepfakes depicting pornography
will likely be unconstitutionally overbroad, and prohibitions on deepfakes
involving children are constitutional when they are obscene. Courts will
likely find that some deepfake pornographies have some societal value.
Pornographic deepfakes can be artistic and not entirely graphic or lewd.
Additionally, the court’s analysis in Free Speech Coalition highlights the
legal importance of an individual being physically harmed, something not
present in personal deepfakes. 182
While the publication of personal deepfakes may and should be
illegal, their creation could remain legal. Killing with the use of a hammer
is illegal, but hammers themselves are not illegal. In the same manner, we
are not obligated to ban the device (the computer and the software used)
that helps create personal deepfakes. The Court believes that “education
and punishment for violations of the law” are to be deterrents. 183
Prohibitions on creating personal deepfakes are unnecessary when
criminal prohibitions on the publications are believed to be deterrents.
Furthermore, in Stanley v. Georgia,184 the Supreme Court ruled
that “the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally
be made a crime.” 185 While there is a right to receive ideas and information
of any social value, we have a “right to be free . . . from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy” and “the right to be let
alone.” 186 The Court reasoned that the government is not in the business
of telling its citizens what books they can read or movies they can watch. 187
The Constitution prevents the government from controlling one’s mind. 188
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See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 262 (2002).
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566–67 (1969) (“But more important, if
the State is only concerned about printed or filmed materials inducing antisocial
conduct, we believe that in the context of private consumption of ideas and
information we should adhere to the view that ‘among free men, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for
violations of the law[.] . . . Given the present state of knowledge, the State may
no more prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may
lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on
the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade spirits.”).
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394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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Id. at 559.
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Id. at 564.
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The Court, too, doubted its ability to draw the line between mere
entertainment and the transmission of ideas.189 A pornography is a unique
production that is arguably entertainment but likely does not add to the
marketplace of ideas or help parse out false information. 190 Personal
deepfakes are both entertainment and false information. Nonetheless, the
Court’s emphasis on the sacrosanctity of what happens in the privacy of
one’s home will likely protect the creation of deepfakes. This is the correct
application of the law. A person has a right to not be portrayed online in a
false light. However, individuals do not have a right to prevent others from
tampering with images in the privacy of their own homes and for personal
use. While not everyone consents to their photograph being used in
Photoshop or being cut out and placed on top of another body in a collage,
these very acts are nevertheless legal. Illegal harms are embedded in the
deepfakes that society will see.

CONCLUSION
Life-like personal deepfakes are here, and the law does not
currently protect individuals who have not consented or participated in the
production and publication of false pornography. Tort doctrines and
revenge porn statutes were not intended to tackle the consequences of a
technology that transforms a person’s sexual fantasy into reality. There
will soon be pressure on courts bend statutes to protect victims of personal
deepfakes and on legislatures to take the necessary steps to prohibit future
publications. There ought to be a federal prohibition on the online
publication or dissemination of any personal deepfake. While we wait for
these legal mechanisms to potentially fall into place, the technology is only
going to improve. It takes hours to make a deepfake. Soon, it will take
seconds, and the product will be indistinguishable from real videos. We
need to discuss the harms of personal deepfakes now.

189
190

Id. at 566.
See discussion supra Part I.

